Israel is currently facing a significant crisis following its disastrous failure in the bloody war on Gaza. The goals announced by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the war on Gaza have not been achieved. Israel has not been able to eliminate Hamas, as evident by its repeated reoccupation of areas it previously claimed to have secured, where it allegedly destroyed Palestinian factions’ brigades. Israel has also failed to free the Israeli hostages in Gaza, secure the Gaza border, or eliminate the threat from the Gaza Strip. Despite the ongoing genocidal war, rockets continue to be fired from Gaza. The biggest failure lies in Israel’s inability to devise a realistic plan for the post-war phase. The situation on the ground suggests that everything could revert to its pre-October 7 state over time, with Hamas potentially regrouping and rebuilding its capabilities in Gaza as soon as the occupation forces withdraw. The situation in northern Gaza is a vivid example of this, and this likely forms the core of the disagreement between Netanyahu and U.S. President Joe Biden, who fears losing the election due to the ongoing war with no prospect of a ceasefire or a plan for the day after.
Israel is focusing on the invasion of Rafah as a gateway to achieving the complete victory Netanyahu desires. However, the majority of Israeli politicians, military leaders, experts, and political analysts doubt the Israeli army’s ability to secure a victory that achieves the war’s goals. The disagreement with the United States over Rafah is not about the invasion and occupation of the city but about the Israeli army’s ability to carry out the operation without causing significant civilian casualties among Palestinians. The U.S. administration has stated that it has not seen a feasible Israeli plan for evacuating civilians. The tactical interests between the two parties diverge, with Washington aiming to arrange the post-war regional landscape to normalize relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia, establish a new alliance to prevent Chinese and Russian expansion in the region, and build bases and alliances with Arab countries. This involves ending the war, bringing the “renewed” Palestinian Authority back to Gaza, and opening a political horizon that could lead to conflict resolution and peace.
Netanyahu opposes this path, believing that he can shape the reality in Gaza without granting Palestinians a unified entity that would eventually lead to an independent state. He insists on establishing a local Palestinian administration in Gaza to replace Hamas’ rule and prevent the return of the Palestinian Authority to Gaza. However, he faces a significant dilemma with this approach, as he cannot find a Palestinian partner, even on an individual level, to implement this plan. This has forced him to consider rebuilding the civil administration under the Israeli army in Gaza, which would handle relief efforts and address people’s humanitarian needs until an alternative Palestinian administration or body willing to cooperate with the occupation is available. The situation in Gaza has become even more complicated after the occupation of the Rafah crossing, creating significant tension with Egypt, which has hinted at withdrawing its ambassador from Tel Aviv and reducing diplomatic relations with Israel. This prompted the Israeli government to propose handing over the Rafah crossing to Palestinian Authority employees without official recognition or representation of the Authority. These employees would simply serve as a civilian committee overseeing the delivery of aid. This idea angered the Palestinian Authority, which rejected it entirely and insisted on a comprehensive plan for Gaza, starting with a ceasefire.
Hamas, for its part, has begun to speak of not returning to govern Gaza after the war, based on the premise that the situation can no longer bear the Strip remaining under siege and in distress due to Hamas’ rule. It proposes either a national unity government without Hamas’s participation but with its approval, potentially composed of a technocratic government of independent figures, or the establishment of a temporary administration to manage Gaza’s affairs, composed of local figures agreed upon by the factions. This second option does not differ much from the Israeli proposal, except in the cover it would provide for such a body.
The Palestinian dilemma lies in the lack of national agreement on the post-war phase, or even on managing current affairs. Each side, whether the leadership and the Authority on one hand or Hamas on the other, is pursuing its own agenda as if we are not living through one of the greatest catastrophes ever faced by the Palestinian people. Those who dream that the repeated international talk about the two-state solution, even if multiple countries recognize Palestine, will change the reality and lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state without preparing the internal Palestinian situation to meet the requirements for statehood, are dreaming and do not understand the nature of international complexities. Yes, there is an opportunity stronger than ever before, but this opportunity could slip away if we do not act wisely.
Two things must happen on the Palestinian side to push the world toward imposing a Palestinian state: first, the rapid achievement of national unity based on the program of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), with the current conditions allowing for this and requiring flexibility from all parties for this national goal. Second, the establishment of a single national institution to govern the Palestinian territories by unifying the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip under the name “Government of Palestine”. This would align with international recognition of the State of Palestine and overcome the dispute over the Oslo Accords. The current form and weak performance of the Authority alone cannot control the situation or create the conditions for statehood amid division and failure to meet citizens’ needs and achieve any reform. Even when a government with powers is discussed, those powers are quickly eroded by turning reform announcements into mere distractions that cannot be marketed. And when there is no national reference for supervision and oversight of performance. Hamas is also incapable of doing anything to solve Gaza’s problems, which were a primary cause of the current situation, and it has failed in governing Gaza. It must realize that the homeland is bigger than all.
Author: Ashraf Ajrami